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• Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus has maintained a largely
non-market economic system. This did not prevent rapid growth of its economy over
a sustained period up to 2011. However, the period of economic growth in Belarus
seems to be over. The factors that underpinned Belarus’s growth, mainly the beneficial
external environment, have gradually disappeared. As a result, the country is
confronted by the need to start the far-reaching programme of market-oriented
economic reforms and macroeconomic stabilisation which it tried to avoid for so long.
Reform will not be easy, economically and politically. 
• The potential hardship facing Belarus could be at least partly cushioned by external
assistance, in the first instance from the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank. However, the IMF has relatively fresh memories of the failure of its 2009-10
Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Belarus, which provided substantial balance-of-
payments support, but which was derailed by its too-narrow focus on monetary and
fiscal quantitative performance criteria, and by insufficient reform commitment on the
Belarusian side. Other donors, such as the European Union, might be reluctant to offer
assistance as long as Belarus does not improve its poor human rights record and start
some political reforms. 
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1. All the transition
indicators use the scale
from 1 (no progress at all)
to 4+, ie 4.33 (completion
of transition agenda). 
2. See http://2015.tr-
ebrd.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/
TR2015_16_CA_Belarus.pdf.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
Belarus has maintained a largely non-market eco-
nomic system. This did not prevent rapid growth
of its economy over a sustained period up to
2011. However, the period of economic growth in
Belarus seems to be over. The factors that
underpinned Belarus’s growth, mainly the benefi-
cial external environment, have gradually disap-
peared. As a result, the country is confronted by
the need to start the far-reaching programme
of market-oriented economic reforms and macro-
economic stabilisation which it tried to avoid
for so long. Reform will not be easy, economically
and politically. 
The potential hardship facing Belarus could be at
least partly cushioned by external assistance, in
the first instance from the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank. However, the IMF has
relatively fresh memories of the failure of its 2009-
10 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Belarus,
which provided substantial balance-of-payments
support, but which was derailed by its too-narrow
focus on monetary and fiscal quantitative
performance criteria, and by insufficient reform
commitment on the Belarusian side. Other donors,
such as the European Union, might be reluctant to
offer assistance as long as Belarus does not
improve its poor human rights record and start
some political reforms. 
In this analysis, we describe the characteristics of
Belarus’s economic model, explain how the
Belarus growth ‘miracle’ was possible, why it
cannot be continued, the reforms that are needed
and why they might be difficult to implement and,
finally, what the chances are, and what the condi-
tions might be, under which Belarus could obtain
external support. 
EUROPE’S LAST NON-MARKET ECONOMY
According to the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development’s (EBRD) transition indica-
tors1 Belarus is among the least advanced of the
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former USSR’s successor states in building a
market economy. It is one of three reform
laggards, the others being Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. This assessment relates to both ‘first
generation’ reforms such as price, trade and
foreign exchange liberalisation and small-scale
privatisation (Figures 1-3), and to more sophisti-
cated ‘second generation’ reforms such as large-
scale privatisation, governance and enterprise
restructuring, and competition policy (Figures 4-
6). On average, all post-Soviet countries other than
the Baltic states, lag behind central and eastern
Europe in the implementation of ‘second genera-
tion’ reforms, which makes Belarus even less
advanced than Figures 4-6 suggest.
Price controls in Belarus have remained extensive,
and have been reinforced with each macroeco-
nomic crisis. For example, in 2011 after a major
devaluation and its consequent pass-through to
domestic prices, administrative price regulation of
‘socially important goods’ reached almost half (49
percent) of the consumer price index (CPI) basket.
It subsequently went gradually down to 25
percent in 2014. However, after the devaluation of
the Belarusian ruble (BYR) at the end of 2014, a
temporary ban on all price increases was imposed
(IMF, 2015a; IMF, 2015b) and stayed in force until
April 20152. 
Use of such broad price regulation has led to price
distortions, which are particularly evident in the
utility sector. Electricity tariffs remain, on average,
at the level of about 50 percent of cost recovery.
For natural gas, central heating and water supply,
the situation is even worse, with tariffs converg-
ing to 20 percent of the cost recovery level in early
2015 (IMF, 2015a). It is worth remembering that
Belarus is a net importer of energy resources
(mainly from Russia) and excessive energy
imports contribute to trade and current account
deficits. 
Although in 2001 Belarus formally introduced
current-account convertibility of the BYR (as
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Figure 1: Commonwealth of Independent States,
progress in price liberalisation, 2014
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Figure 2: Commonwealth of Independent States,
progress in trade and foreign exchange system
liberalisation, 2014
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Figure 3: Commonwealth of Independent States,
progress in small-scale privatisation, 2014
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Figure 4: Commonwealth of Independent States,
progress in large-scale privatisation, 2014
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Figure 5: Commonwealth of Independent States:
progress in governance and enterprise
restructuring, 2014
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Figure 6: Commonwealth of Independent States,
progress in competition policy, 2014
Source for all figures: EBRD Transition Indicators, 2014. 
Note: AM = Armenia,  AZ = Azerbaijan, BY = Belarus, GE = Georgia, KZ = Kazakhstan, KG = Kyrgyzstan, MD = Moldova,
RU = Russia, TJ = Tajikstan, TM = Turkmenistan, UA = Ukraine, UZ = Uzbekistan.
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determined by Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles
of  Agreement), it has never fully respected it.
Various forms of foreign-exchange restrictions
have remained in place and in times of market
strain, for example in 2008-09, 2011 and 2014-
15, exchange restrictions were intensified, lead-
ing to the re-emergence of a ‘black’ foreign
exchange market and multiple exchange rates
(see IMF, 2015c).
The role of the private sector remains limited.
In 2010, according to the most recent EBRD esti-
mate, the private sector’s share of Belarusian
GDP amounted to 30 percent only3; probably it has
not changed substantially since then. The activi-
ties of private firms are administratively restricted
in various ways and are often the target of
hostile government propaganda. Meanwhile,
state-owned enterprises must still meet manda-
tory production targets, as in the era of the
centrally-planned economy. If they fail to do so,
their managers put their careers at risk or even
face criminal prosecution. 
Overall, Belarus retains a largely non-market
economy, which is business unfriendly (IMF,
2012). Not surprisingly, the Heritage Foundation’s
2015 Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) ranks
Belarus 153 among 178 countries, making it one
of the ‘repressed’ economies4. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, the World Bank Doing Business ranking
placed Belarus much higher in its 2015 and 2016
reports – ranked 43 and 44 respectively, out of
189. Belarus has also systematically improved its
‘distance to frontier’ (ie to the best practices)
scores since 20105 . 
However, methodological differences must be
taken into account. The World Bank Doing Busi-
ness ranking concentrates on the number of
administrative procedures (and their length)
related to starting in business, dealing with
construction permits, getting electricity, register-
ing property, obtaining credit, protecting minority
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders,
enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency.
3. See
http://www.ebrd.com/down-
loads/research/econom-
ics/macrodata/sci.xls.
4. http://www.heritage.org/
index/ranking.
5. http://www.doingbusi-
ness.org/custom-
query#Result.
It hardly captures the systemic remnants of
a command economy such as de-facto manda-
tory production targets, and government-inspired
investment, exchange restrictions, high inflation,
or politically motivated insecurity of property
rights. The latter are, at least partly, included
in the IEF. 
RAPID GROWTH
Despite the slow pace of market reforms (or even
their reversal in the second half of the 1990s), the
Belarusian economy recorded quite impressive
growth for the decade and a half between 1997
and 2011 (Figure 7). This allowed some politi-
cians and economists in the country to claim the
advantage of the ‘Belarusian economic model’
over the market-oriented transition strategies pur-
sued by Belarus’s neighbours.
To understand how the last enclave of the non-
market economy in Europe not only managed to
survive but also was able to grow rapidly, one must
take into consideration several specific factors. 
First, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991,
Belarus was the second most developed country,
after Russia, of the newly-formed Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), in terms of GDP per
capita at purchasing power parity (PPP).
It enjoyed well-developed physical infrastructure
and human capital and its industrial capacities
were relatively modern and better oriented
towards consumer and producer market demand,
compared to other republics. This legacy allowed
Belarusian industry to continue its previous role
as a supplier of medium-quality and relatively
inexpensive consumer goods to other post-Soviet
countries, primarily Russia. 
Second, also since the Soviet era, Russian oil and
natural gas exports to Europe have transited
through Belarus. Unlike Ukraine, Belarus has man-
aged to extract substantial economic rent from
this activity. This was made possible by various
integration projects with Russia since the mid-
‘Belarus's state-owned enterprises must still meet mandatory production targets, as in the era
of the centrally-planned economy. If they fail to do so, their managers put their careers
at risk or even face criminal prosecution.’ 
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1990s. Most of these, except the most recent
– the 2010 customs union and the 2015 Eurasian
Economic Union (EaEU) – were short lived. How-
ever, they allowed Belarus to purchase Russian
energy resources at a lower price. Moreover, for
several years, Belarus was able to resell to other
countries Russian oil purchased at domestic or
nearly domestic Russian prices (ie without export
duties) and processed in Belarusian refineries
(Novopolotsk and Mozyr) at market prices. 
Third, unlike most other post-communist coun-
tries, Belarus has retained political and adminis-
trative capacity to continue operating a sort of
command economic system. This was a result of
the reluctance of the then prime minister
Myechislav Kebich and his government in 1991-
94 to start even partial market reforms. Belarus’s
non-market system was then reinforced by the
authoritarian political regime built by Alexander
Lukashenko since he became president in 1994. 
Fourth, the largely command character of the
Belarusian economy manifested itself, among
other ways, in a very high investment rate, signif-
icantly exceeding the average in the CIS and
central and eastern European countries (Figure 8).
This was somewhat reminiscent of the experience
of forced industrialisation in the communist era.
Most investment came from state-owned enter-
prises or was committed under government
programmes. Obviously, such a high investment
rate had to contribute to rapid growth but the non-
market character of the investment process led to
its low and steadily decreasing effectiveness
(Kruk and Bornukova, 2014).
Finally, as we know from economic history,
growth rates in non-market systems are not
always fully comparable to those in market
economies. Thisis not only because of potential
over-reporting bias caused by the system of
mandatory  output  targets. Even more important
is the incomparability of GDP deflators when
prices do not reflect the relative scarcity of goods
because of extensive price controls, multiple
exchange rates, trade  barriers and physical short-
ages of good and services (see for example
Bratkowski, 1993). Even in the periods of less
severe price regulation and a single exchange
rate, the choice of goods and services in the
Belarusian market has remained more limited
than in neighbouring countries. 
MACROECONOMIC DISEQUILIBRIA
As Figure 9 shows, Belarus has suffered from
chronic inflation at the high or moderately high
level, despite its administrative price controls.
Cumulatively, between 2000 and 2014, the con-
sumer price index increased more than 17-fold (!)
giving the country the dubious honour of inflation
champion of the former USSR.
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Figure 7: Belarus, GDP, constant prices, %
change, 1996-2014
Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook
database, October 2015.
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Figure 8: Investment rate in Belarus, CIS and
emerging and developing Europe, % of GDP,
1996-2014
Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook
database, October 2015. Note: emerging and developing
Europe includes Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland,
Romania, Serbia and Turkey. 
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tions involving the sale of Belarusian assets to
Russian owners, such as sales to Gazprom in 2007
and 2011 of shares in Beltransgaz, which operates
a gas transit pipeline from Russia to the EU. 
FISCAL AND QUASI-FISCAL BALANCES
When an economy suffers from chronic high
inflation and current account deficits, fiscal imbal-
ances are the prime suspect. Paradoxically this is
not the case in Belarus, at least at first sight.
As Figure 14 shows, Belarus has had either fiscal
surpluses or relatively small deficits since 1998.
But the gross public debt statistics look less rosy
(Figure 15). To resolve this apparent inconsis-
tency, two factors must be taken into account: the
necessity of official borrowing to close the
balance-of-payments financing gap and domestic
quasi-fiscal imbalances. 
The second factor explains, to a great degree, the
observed macroeconomic imbalances and
repeated balance-of-payments crises in Belarus
(see Miksjuk et al, 2015). While quasi-fiscal oper-
ations are present in various sectors of Belarusian
economy, such as the energy sector and public
utilities forced to provide their services at tariffs
below the cost-recovery level, they mainly fall on
the banking sector and the central bank. 
State-owned enterprises and farms that have to
meet production targets and invest in new
production capacity (often regardless of the effec-
tive market demand for their output) and carry out
In particular, periodic inflation hikes resulted from
abrupt devaluations of the BYR (see Figure 10).
The most recent was triggered by the currency
crisis in Russia at the end of 2014 and early 2015
(Figure 11) that spilled over to other CIS
economies (Dabrowski, 2015). In turn, these
devaluations were caused by balance-of-pay-
ments crises. Domestic monetary expansion
voriginating from extensive quasi-fiscal activities
has been another source of rapid price growth.
High inflation and frequent devaluations under-
mined trust in the BYR, which led to the high
level of actual dollarisation. The ratio of foreign-
currency denominated loans to total loans
exceeded 55 percent in the first quarter of 2015
(IMF, 2015a). 
As Figure 12 shows, Belarus recorded continuous
high current account deficits (resulting, among
other factors, from the high investment rates)
which, unlike in other transition economies, were
largely financed by official borrowing (mainly from
Russia, the Anti-Crisis Fund of the Eurasian
Economic Community, and the IMF) and only
partly by net inward foreign direct investment
(Figure 13). As a result, the gross international
reserves of the National Bank of the Republic of
Belarus (NBRB) remained at the low level of $5.1
billion at the end of 2014 (IMF, 2015a). The net
NBRB international reserves, ie gross reserves
minus foreign liabilities, are negative.
FDI flows have mainly originated from Russia.
Some have resulted from one-off large transac-
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Figure 9: Belarus, end-of-year inflation, %, 1996-
2014
Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook
database, October 2015.
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Figure 10: End-of-year exchange rate, BYR/1
USD, 1992-2014
Source: Bruegel based on
http://www.nbrb.by/engl/statistics/Rates/RatesDaily.asp.
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Figure 11: Daily exchange rate, BYR/1 USD and
BYR/1 EUR, December 2014 – January 2015
Source: Bruegel based on
http://www.nbrb.by/engl/statistics/Rates/RatesDaily.asp.
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Figure 12: Belarus, current account balance,
% of GDP, 1996-2014
Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook
database, October 2015.
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Figure 13: Belarus, net inward FDI, percent of
GDP, 1996-2014
Source: Bruegel based on http://unctadstat.unctad.org/
wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.
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Figure 14: Belarus, general government net
lending/borrowing, % of GDP, 1998-2014
Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook
database, October 2015.
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Figure 15: Belarus, end-of-year general
government gross debt, % of GDP, 2004-14
Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook
database, October 2015.
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Figure 16: Belarus, nominal increase in
monetary aggregates, %, 2011-14
Source: Bruegel based on IMF (2015a), Table 1, p26.
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sion to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2012
and the formation of the EaEU exposed Belarusian
companies to stronger external competition, on
the Russian and domestic markets. In fact, being
still far from completing its own WTO accession
bid, Belarus has become unilaterally exposed to
the WTO rules and competition from WTO members
(via the EaEU) without symmetric access to their
markets. This situation will become even more
disadvantageous for Belarus following Kaza-
khstan’s WTO accession, which was completed in
November 2015. 
Gradual withdrawal by Russia of preferential
prices for imported oil and gas has reduced
substantially the oil and gas-related rents that
accrue to the Belarusian economy and budget.
The oil price decline in the second half of 2014
further reduced this rent and led to deterioration in
Belarus’s terms of trade. 
Belarus has also been hit indirectly by the conse-
quences of the Ukrainian conflict, including the
western sanctions against Russia and, especially,
by Russia’s countersanctions against the EU and
US, even if some Belarusian enterprises have
been able to either substitute EU exporters to
Russia or profit from circumvention of Russian
countersanctions in the single EaEU customs
space in the short-term. 
The opportunity to receive further financial
support from Russia or the EaEU in order to close
the balance-of-payments gap has also diminished
because of the increasing fiscal constraints in
Russia and geopolitical differences over the
Ukrainian conflict. More strategically, President
Lukashenko seems to be reluctant to further
increase Belarus’s dependence on Russia. 
THE REQUIRED REFORM AGENDA…
To avoid a new round of the balance-of-payments
crisis and to return to growth Belarus must
finally accelerate its process of transition to
a market economy. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation and completing
basic reforms are the most urgent tasks. These
require the abandonment of price controls, direct
and indirect subsidies, full current account con-
the government’s required wage increases are
kept afloat by directed loans on highly conces-
sionary terms. Directed and subsidised loans also
serve as an instrument to support various
government programmes, for example, in the
housing sector. The exact legal forms of these
loans have changed frequently, so measuring
them is not an easy task. According to the IMF
(2015a) their size increased from about 6 percent
of GDP in 2010 to 9.3 percent in 2011 and then
gradually decreased to about 4 percent of GDP
in 2014. Without any doubt, this was a major
driver of the rapid increase in both NBRB reserve
money and BYR broad money (Figure 16), and a
primary cause of the subsequent balance-of-pay-
ments crises.
Directed lending also leads to high levels of non-
performing loans in the banking sector and the
need for periodic recapitalisation of state-owned
banks. For example, the cost of bank restructuring
measures amounted to 4.9 percent of GDP in 2011
and is expected to amount to a further 2.8 percent
of GDP in 2015. In addition, each year, the govern-
ment must cover part of its credit guarantees
related to directed lending. In the period 2011-15,
this involved expenditures in the range of 0.3 and
0.9 percent of annual GDP (IMF, 2015a). These
items are not included in the general government
balances reported in Figure 14.
THE END OF THE BELARUSIAN MODEL?
As seen in Figure 7, the debate on the sources and
costs of Belarus’s high growth rate has already
become a historical matter. Since 2011, growth
has slowed substantially. For 2015, a 3.6 percent
contraction is expected, according to the IMF
World Economic Outlook October 2015 forecasts.
The reasons for such a dramatic change are
numerous. 
Over the years, the country’s relative structural
advantages have gradually disappeared. Growth
in total factor productivity in Belarus’s dirigiste
economy was relatively modest until 2008, and
then started to decline (Kruk and Bornukova,
2014). Unreformed state-owned enterprises not
sufficiently exposed to competitive market
pressures lost part of their export markets, includ-
ing Russia and other CIS countries. Russia’s acces-
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6. See
http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/sec/pr/2015/pr1553
2.htm.
vertibility of the BYR and the elimination of quasi-
fiscal operations, in particular, directed lending.
The NBRB must obtain genuine independence
with a single mandate to ensure price stability. 
However, this is not enough. As previous experi-
ence demonstrates, macroeconomic stabilisation
will not be sustainable without accompanying
microeconomic, structural and institutional
reforms. These should involve a broad set of
measures aimed at, among other objectives,
dismantling the remnants of the command
system, large-scale privatisation, opening up to
foreign investment, completing WTO accession,
closing down loss-making firms, easing the busi-
ness and investment climate and reforming the
financial system. Such an agenda will not be easy,
economically, socially or politically. However,
Belarus has lost too much time to wait longer. 
…AND ITS POTENTIAL PITFALLS
Since the end of 2014, there have been attempts
to modify Belarus’s economic policy, including
personnel changes in the government economic
team and the NBRB, and a change in the official
rhetoric in favour of less government control. For
the first time, the presidential election in October
2015 was not preceded by massive credit expan-
sion and administrative pressure for wage
increases. The new leadership of the NBRB
declared it would move to a flexible exchange rate
for the BYR and monetary targeting, which will
replace the previous regime of a crawling band
against a currency basket. On the microeconomic
front, there have been some measures to restruc-
ture the largest state-owned enterprises, includ-
ing shedding of redundant labour (Alachnovic,
2015). These moves go in the right direction, but
are not sufficient to restore growth and ensure
macroeconomic stability in the long term. 
It remains a big question whether the country’s
authorities will decide to intensify reforms and
make them sufficiently comprehensive. Apart
from the usual political risks that accompany far-
going market reforms in any country, in Belarus
reform has always been seen as a challenge to its
authoritarian political regime. This has been so far
the main difference between Belarus and other CIS
countries, many of which are also far from political
freedom and democracy. However, for Belarus the
status quo does not look sustainable: it does not
offer the continuation of economic growth and
living standard improvements, the basic precon-
ditions of the regime’s political legitimacy. 
THE QUESTION OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT
Another question relates to the potential external
support for a reform process. Obviously, Belarus
can count on the support of the Bretton Woods
institutions – in first instance, the IMF. The latter
started discussing the prospects for a three-year
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme with
Belarusian authorities in November 2015 but it
remains unclear how long this negotiation will take
and what its final outcome will be. As put diplo-
matically in the IMF press release of 20 November
2015 ‘…discussions on some issues require
more time’6. These are, most likely, structural and
institutional issues that, as discussed, are key
conditions for reform success. If completed
successfully, the EFF might be supplemented by
World Bank loans focused on concrete structural
and institutional reforms. 
The IMF faces a major challenge to avoid repeat-
ing the mistakes of the 2009 SBA when under the
geopolitically motivated pressure of some its
major shareholders (including the EU), the
programme was insufficiently tough and compre-
hensive (especially in relation to structural bench-
marks). The Belarusian authorities used the
programme’s various loopholes to continue
directed lending to state-owned enterprises on
concessionary terms (IMF, 2011 and 2012) and
to de-facto finance the 2010 presidential election
‘In Belarus, reform has always been seen as a challenge to the authoritarian political regime,
but the status quo does not oﬀer continuation of economic growth and living standard
improvements, the basic preconditions of the regime’s political legitimacy.’ 
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campaign, which ended up with the large-scale
currency crisis in the first half of 2011 (ie just after
completion of the SBA). 
As discussed, the success of macroeconomic sta-
bilisation in Belarus depends on a front-loaded
programme to dismantle the legacies of the com-
mand system, complete basic market reforms and
carry out comprehensive microeconomic restruc-
turing. Some of these reforms should go beyond
the standard agenda of SBA/EFF and even World
Bank programmes, especially when they touch
governance issues and the political system. 
Here interventions by other bilateral and multilat-
eral donors, including the EU and the US, play usu-
ally a useful role. However, it remains unclear if
Belarus can expect such support, similar to other
Eastern Partnership countries, without carrying
out at least limited political reforms and improv-
ing its poor human rights record. 
To restructure its economy, Belarus also needs
large-scale FDI, primarily from the OECD countries.
This might be difficult to accomplish as long as
Belarus does not improve its business and gover-
nance image and fails to complete its macroeco-
nomic stabilisation. Although in the 2014
Transparency International Corruption Perception
Index, Belarus is rated ahead of Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine, Tajik-
istan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, its position
far down the ranking in place 119 out of 174
countries  means that this area also requires a lot
of effort. 
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